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In *Redd v. McGrath*, the Ninth Circuit determined that subparagraph (D) applies when determining the date on which the one-year statutory period begins to run for federal habeas claims challenging parole determinations. *Redd*, 343 F.3d at 1080. The Court held that under this subparagraph, the limitations period begins to run when the "factual predicate" of an inmate's habeas claim, "could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." *Id.* (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).) Although Petitioner advances that subparagraph (A) should apply, the Court rejected this argument, noting that subparagraph (A) uses the word "judgement," which refers to the judgment of the prisoner's criminal conviction and does not apply to administrative decisions. *Id.* at 1081. On the other hand, subparagraph (D) is proper because it determines that the factual predicate of habeas claims challenging parole determinations is the date on which the inmate could have learned of the administrative decision he was challenging. *Id.* at 1084. Therefore, subparagraph (D) is the proper section to apply to petitions containing parole denials.

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In the case at bar, the date on which Petitioner could have learned of the denial of parole by
the Governor is the date on which the letter was faxed to him: May 19, 2005. This date serves as
the factual predicate for calculating the statute of limitations, with the period commencing the
next day on May 20, 2005. Redd, 343 F.3d at 1084. Accordingly, the starting date for
determining whether Petitioner filed in a timely matter is May 20, 2005 and the statute of
limitations was correctly calculated in Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons stated
herein and in Respondent's motion to dismiss filed July 30, 2007, this Court should grant the
motion.

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Dated: September 4, 2007

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Respectfully submitted,

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Respondent's Reply to Petitioner's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss

DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY U.S. MAIL

Case Name: Batie v. Kane

No.: C07-2402 MMC

I declare:

I am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a member of the California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and not a party to this matter. I am familiar with the business practice at the Office of the Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placed in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business.

On September 4, 2007, I served the attached

REPLY TO PETITIONER'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS

by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General at 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000, San Francisco, CA 94102-7004, addressed as follows:

John L. Batie C-34674 **Correctional Training Facility** P.O. Box 686 Soledad, CA 93960-0686 in pro per

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on September 4, 2007, at San Francisco, California.

L. Santos	L. Santas
Declarant	Signature

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